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Beyond the American Century 
Walter Lippmann and American Grand Strategy, 1943-1950 
  
That ambivalent Jeremiah of the press, Walter Lippmann…1 
Dean Acheson 
 
As the United States became a world power, journalist and intellectual 
Walter Lippmann feared that it would become its own worst enemy. 
During and after World War Two, he tried to steer the country towards 
coherent statecraft, to define the national interest and the limits of power, 
and give geopolitical expression to the role of the United States as the 
core of an Atlantic strategic system. But in response to world war, the 
Truman Doctrine and the Korean War, he became pessimistic about the 
country’s ability to conduct strategy effectively. In the prophetic tradition, 
he believed that a fatal symbiosis between America’s growing strength 
and domestic politics led it towards crisis. Though at times ahistorical, 
Lippmann’s concept of strategy deserves attention for its dialogue 
between power and identity, for its questioning of ‘ends’ as well as means, 
and for its focus on the danger of self-defeating behaviour.   
 
The prospect of America’s decline as a world power has raised fresh interest in grand 
strategy.
2
 Our understanding of America’s present dilemmas can be strengthened by a 
closer reading of the journalist and intellectual Walter Lippmann (1889-1974). Lippmann 
is a central figure in diplomatic history. Foreign Affairs named US Foreign Policy: Shield 
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of the Republic as one of the most important diplomatic works in seventy-five years.
3
 
Historian Walter Russell Mead regards Lippmann as Jeffersonian in his understanding of 
American statecraft.
4
 During the Gulf War of 1991, critics of American diplomacy turned 
to Lippmann’s arguments for limiting military commitments, his emphasis on the 
stopping points of power, and his preference for blue-water maritime strategies above 
fatal adventures on land.
5
 During internally divisive wars from Vietnam to Iraq, they 
turned to Lippmann’s concern for the domestic ‘political foundations of US statecraft.’6 
Despite this prominence, Lippmann was also a disappointed figure. Between World War 
Two and the Korean War, he became pessimistic. He struggled to influence policy and to 
formulate coherent answers to the dilemmas facing the new superpower, namely how to 
define America’s interests by finding a middle point between the extremes of isolation 
and globalism. 
 
As this article argues, Lippmann argued within a prophetic tradition that emphasized the 
internal political causes of strategic failure. The concept of prophecy is a promising point 
of entry into understanding the ‘wave’ of political realists of the early Cold War.7 If 
‘strategy’ is the orchestration of ends, ways and means in the context of actual or possible 
armed conflict,
8
 and if a ‘defence intellectual’ is a figure who interprets the role of US 
military power to a general audience,
9
 a ‘prophet’ is a public intellectual who identifies a 
failure, traces the causes of the injury historically, and calls for the restoration of a more 
enlightened past.  In this tradition, Lippmann’s writings formed an ‘American Jeremiad’, 
a form of political rhetoric that is both ethical and eschatological.
10
 Lippmann worried 
that America was vulnerable not primarily because of externalities such as dangerous 
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enemies or new weapons, but because of its own pathologies. Left unchecked, such 
pathologies could cause America to behave in self-defeating ways, provoking counter-
balancing coalitions or leading to disastrous peripheral wars. Americans, he argued, had 
lost sight of their forefathers’ adroit statecraft and fell prey to utopian ideals, just as Great 
Power conflict returned.  
 
This article examines how Lippmann’s evolving ideas interlocked with World War Two 
and the early Cold War to produce his vision, which has not been fully explored in the 
existing literature.
11 Ronald Steel’s biography is stimulating but not an overarching 
interpretation of Lippmann’s strategic thought.12 Joel Rosenthal and Kenneth Thompson 
show how intellectuals such as Lippmann tried to temper Wilsonian idealism by instilling 
a sense of responsibility in American diplomacy.
13
 This article explains the growth of that 
realism historically. Vibeke Tjalve shows how prophets such as Hans Morgenthau and 
Reinhold Niebuhr recast traditions of the puritan ‘Jeremiad’ to articulate an alternative, 
self-critical patriotism.
14
 This article shows how Lippmann through his Jeremiads 
developed a theory about America’s strategic fallibility. 
 
The argument has three parts. First I place Lippmann in the intellectual context of the 
renaissance in strategic thinking during World War Two. Lippmann conceived of strategy 
as the preservation of cohesion at home through a restrained activism abroad, a vision of 
an Atlantic geopolitical identity tempered by a hard-headed calculation of strength. 
Where other minds focused primarily on European precedents, Lippmann turned to 
America’s early history. If he saw popular attitudes to foreign policy as ‘inconstant, 
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irrational and ill-considered’15, during and after World War Two he argued for the revival 
of classical strategic principles, principally the need to balance power with 
commitments.
16
 Both strands of ideas came together in 1943-1950 to generate the notion 
of the ‘Lippmann gap’, the view that efficient strategy and the internal order of the state 
were symbiotic. Inherently volatile republican democracies and bad strategies could 
reinforce each other, leading to a spiral of drift abroad and division at home.  
 
Second, more theoretically than his contemporaries, Lippmann doubted America’s 
capacity to strategize. America’s success, its rise to unprecedented relative power at a 
relatively low cost, loosened its restraint. Its tendency towards extremes prevented it from 
making war conclusively, so that it could not translate military victories into lasting 
political outcomes. These doubts were called forth and accentuated by the experience of 
World War Two, the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the Korean War (1950-1953). Finally, 
I appraise the limits of his prophecy and why it still matters. He was a Jeremiah bound to 
be disappointed. Lippmann had a complex, adversarial relationship with the state. His 
pessimism can be traced partly to nostalgia for America’s foundational era. He blamed 
modern democracy, scapegoating it for problems that are inherent in strategy itself. 
Nevertheless, Lippmann is worth reading because he offers a conception of strategy not 
as a narrow, reductionist exercise in pursuing fixed ‘ends’, but as a dialogue between a 
country’s identity and its power. 
 
Lippmann’s conception of strategy grew within a debate in 1939-1941 about the nature of 
American vulnerability. As Nazi Germany conquered continental Europe, two paradigms 
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competed: ‘Fortress America’ and ‘national security.’17 ‘Fortress America’, was a more 
restricted concept. It was bounded by geographical limits, was more reactive than 
anticipatory, and trusted in America’s inherent capacity to defend its region. Conversely, 
‘national security’, was an expansive and potentially unbounded view of America’s 
security interests and was later embodied in Henry Luce’s concept of ‘The American 
Century.’18 These interests lay beyond America’s region, and America needed an 
extended military presence to advance them. In spirit, ‘Fortress America’ conceived 
America’s region as large and defensible, presuming against intervention abroad, and 
favoured maritime strategies. The latter saw America as vulnerable in a shrinking world, 
and was more disposed to land power and to global commitments.   
 
World War Two accelerated the shift from ‘Fortress America’ to the ‘American 
Century.’19 Even before Imperial Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, 
America expanded its security domain by coercing Japan with economic sanctions, by 
providing material assistance to Great Britain, by acquiring new bases from 
Newfoundland to British Guiana, by fighting an undeclared naval war with Germany in 
the Atlantic, and by redrawing the map of its own hemisphere. After Pearl Harbor, 
policymakers and the public majority concluded that new military capabilities made 
‘Fortress America’ redundant. New conditions meant that America could not rely on its 
geopolitical luck of being distant from enemies and flanked by oceans and unthreatening 
neighbours. The threat from trans-oceanic predators was produced by the confluence of 
new military technology (especially long-range airpower) and geopolitics (the danger of a 
conquering state creating a dangerous imbalance of power). A dominant Nazi Germany 
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and Imperial Japan could threaten the homeland with encirclement, economic suffocation 
or even invasion. Military planners followed Washington’s vision that American security 
depended not only on a vigilant homeland defence, but on a favourable balance of power 
abroad and the prevention of any state generating overwhelming offensive combat 
power.
20
 War created a willingness to maintain a peacetime military establishment on an 
unprecedented scale.
21
 Once continental and hemispheric, America’s conception of its 
outer defences became extra-regional and global. 
 
These ideas took root through the collaboration of the state with intellectuals. The 
marriage of expertise and mass mobilization was foreshadowed in Roosevelt’s ‘Arsenal 
of Democracy’ address on 29 December 1940. ‘As planes and ships and guns and shells 
are produced, your Government, with its defense experts, can then determine how best to 
us them to defend this hemisphere.’22 ‘National security’ became common public coinage 
and a mainstream academic discipline
23
 with the publication of Edward Mead Earle’s 
collection Makers of Modern Strategy and Nicholas Spykman’s America’s Strategy in 
World Politics.
24
 A concept took root, of strategy in a higher political realm expanded in 
space and time.
25
 The Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted a Brookings Institution study which 
argued for the prevention of any hostile powers or coalitions dominating the Eurasian 
landmass.
26
 
 
Several converging forces drove this renaissance. Global war with its intercontinental 
alliances and scale encouraged the state to make strategy higher and broader. It prompted 
a shift from narrow military plans in isolation to the synchronized campaigns of coalition 
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war.
27
 The rediscovery of strategy was stimulated also by Anglo-American collaboration 
and the encounter with the more politically effective British staff-system. Technology 
enabled global combat in what Roosevelt called ‘a single world conflict.’ This 
connectedness drew attention to mapping and the relationship between space and power. 
Cartographers altered the image of America from a secure continent shielded by distance, 
to a vulnerable island in a world closing in under the Axis triangular stranglehold.
28
 
Scholars such as Edward Mead Earle and Harold Sprout helped produce an educational 
wartime map, the Citizen’s War Atlas.29  
 
The shift from self-defence to national security raised the questions: what and where 
were the limits of American power? How could an enlarged domain be given geopolitical 
expression? Was there a frontier beyond which America’s vital interests were not 
implicated? Lippmann’s US Foreign Policy was his most developed attempt to answer.30 
Like E.H. Carr, Lippmann chastised the interwar generation for its neglect of power.
31
 He 
diagnosed an American ‘habit of mind’,32 the illusion that it could enjoy ‘free security’ 
without engaging in power-politics. Such illusions were bred by peace, liberal idealism, 
and geographic distance. Between the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and 
the war with Spain in 1898, British sea power underwrote the security of America’s 
hemisphere. This arrangement unraveled over time with the demise of British power and 
the rise of German naval power as America failed to come to terms with the challenge to 
British maritime supremacy. The long period of ‘unearned security’ of the nineteenth 
century bred both complacency and idealism, making America averse to the hard-headed 
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alignment of resources with goals. A family of ideas -Pacifism, Disarmament, Anti-
Alliances and Collective Security-eroded coherent strategy. 
 
Lippmann charged that Americans wrongly regarded war as the suspension rather than 
the continuation of politics. The delusion that war was an aberration in human affairs 
paradoxically led the nation to embrace over-ambitious conceptions of its wars as efforts 
to end war itself. Just as it rapidly disarmed in the wake of war, it became a crusader 
when it was roused to belligerency. Looking back to America’s disappointing experience 
of World War One, Lippmann argued that America’s material abundance reinforced the 
illusion that war was a quantitative matter of applying force and mass overwhelmingly 
with political outcomes naturally following. After mobilizing manpower, finance, ships 
and munitions in 1917-18, America failed to harmonise war with political aims.
33
 The net 
result was an insolvent diplomacy that left the nation vulnerable.  
 
US Foreign Policy blamed Wilsonianism. A lapsed Wilsonian himself, Lippmann took 
aim at its faith in law and international institutions, its rejection of alliances, its hostility 
to the plurality of the world and dangerous drive to extirpate other ideologies. In truth, 
Wilsonianism is a conflicted, protean concept.
34
 For Lippmann, it represented not the 
muscular crusading version of 1917, but the pacific ‘one world’ idealism that followed 
the war. Seductively peaceful conditions deluded America into believing it could safely 
disarm, reject alliances and base its behaviour on abstract principles. Unless statesmen 
could ‘with cold calculation organize and regulate the politics of power’, they risked ‘a 
cycle of disastrous wars followed by peace settlements which breed more wars.’35 To 
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secure itself, America must step into the vacuum created by the weakening British 
Empire to create a settled balance of power, applying spheres of influence, military 
muscle and alliances. Paths to peace that lost sight of tough-minded considerations of 
power could not work, whether insulation from the world or excessive faith in 
international institutions. Lippmann looked ahead to the possibility of post-war Great 
Power confrontation and the wartime alliance, which must be preserved as the nucleus of 
peace. 
 
To Lippmann, not isolationism but insolvency was the underlying problem, the failure to 
align power and interests with a surplus of power in reserve. Isolationism is a theory that 
states can secure themselves through detachment from foreign commitments.
36
 By 
contrast, insolvency sprang from a failure to retain coherence between the nation’s power 
and its political interests.
37
 Hence Lippmann’s warning against overstretch: ‘it is just as 
important to define the limit beyond which we will not intervene as it is to convince our 
people that we cannot find security in an isolationist policy.’38 America courted 
insolvency by acquiring far flung interests, almost forty per cent of the earth’s land 
surface, outweighing its power to protect them. In the Western Pacific after the Spanish-
American wars, it acquired commitments that it neither liquidated nor secured. It 
conceded Japanese naval superiority in Asian waters and refused to place adequate 
defensive forces in the Philippines.
39
  
 
Lippmann rejected the myth that Imperial Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor was the result 
of isolationism and that the lesson was the need for worldwide hegemony. Far from being 
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innocently passive, America before 1941 had pursued a forward policy of securing an 
East Asian ‘open door’ of trading interests and paternalism towards China.40  It imposed 
an asset freeze and embargo on oil shipments to coerce Japan. Lippmann warned against 
over-ambitious war aims conceived in the reaction against isolationism. Messianic ideas, 
whether Luce’s missionary notion of ‘the American Century’ to spread democratic 
principles throughout the world, or Wendell Willkie’s internationalist plea for a collective 
security, could be just as fatal as isolation.
41
 These aims carried the ‘insidious temptations 
of imperialism.’ America’s war aims should not be a universalist effort to transform 
world politics, but to work with other great powers to achieve a long period of security 
from ‘world conquerors.’42 
 
In attempting to circumscribe America’s war aims, Lippmann focused on maritime 
peripheries, following not the followers of Halford Mackinder and their emphasis on 
control of the Eurasian heartland, but the navalist Alfred Thayer Mahan in his view of the 
oceans as a commercial conveyer belt and as a highway that could propel aggressors to 
America’s vulnerable ocean flanks. Lippmann was drawn to seapower and the coastal 
centers of industrial-military strength. American security interests extended to the 
coastlines of the Atlantic basin and the Pacific islands, which were also the limits of 
America’s domain.43 He drew on geopolitics to foresee the tragedy of a post-war 
American-Soviet collision. No longer would American-Russian relations be steered by 
‘the historic fact that each is for the other a potential friend in the rear of its potential 
enemies.’ America’s widening frontier, enfolding the German, Japanese, and British 
‘buffer zones’, would collide with the widening Soviet perimeter.44   
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Lippmann took seriously the idea that America was directly threatened and that new 
military technology such as long-range bombers and naval aviation gave the offensive 
edge to aggressors and erased the traditional delaying and shielding effects of distance. 
The Axis threatened to make America an encircled state, its power dispersed over an 
‘immense ocean lake’, inferior to the aggregate power of the ‘Old World’ that would 
have the advantage of initiative.
45
 His arguments were more developed than the 
demagogically promoted fear of Axis conquest and imminent Nazi revolutions in Latin 
America. He pointed to other dangers of a war that extended to the homeland. Even if 
America would defeat any invader on its own soil, Lippmann argued that the ‘condition 
of France in 1918 and 1944’ showed the need to prevent such devastation by conducting 
a forward defence abroad.
46
 Lippmann also drew on another long-established theme, that 
the country’s liberal way of life would be endangered if it were forced to become an 
embattled militarised garrison state in a continual state of emergency.
47
 
 
Lippmann was less technically minded than the aviator and anti-interventionist Charles 
Lindbergh and the geostrategist Nicholas Spykman, who better grasped the limits of 
modern military capabilities. Lindbergh believed the limits were so stringent that ‘self-
defence’ would suffice. Spykman observed that new military machines in some ways 
made long-range aggression more difficult, not less. Would-be trans-oceanic invaders 
would have to reckon with the refueling and supply needs of modern forces, while a 
strong defending air force would minimize the danger of trans-Atlantic invasion.
48
 
Spykman argued that America should intervene not because it was directly threatened but 
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on other grounds, to pre-empt slow economic strangulation that could occur if hostile 
powers dominated other continents.  
 
As others have already demonstrated, there are good reasons to doubt the ‘clear and 
present danger’ and ‘offence-threat’ arguments,49 even if Nazi Germany may have had 
long-term designs on attacking the United States.
50
 America was a large landmass, not a 
small island. Invading and conquering from across two oceans was still difficult. America 
had a strong protective curtain in its navy, and while Britain remained on the board, in 
British seapower. Hitler’s inability to subdue let alone conquer the closer island state of 
Britain assisted Lindbergh’s arguments about the far greater logistical feat of successfully 
attacking across the Atlantic Ocean, or transporting an invasion force unmolested. 
Moreover, America from its bases had combat interception reach to disrupt or deny any 
aggressor. Provided it maintained a sufficient coastal defence, it enjoyed ‘home’ 
advantage through shorter supply lines and the ability to apply a superior weight of force 
over a smaller distance.  
 
Consider also another fear Lippmann entertained, whereby an aggressor uses nearby 
territories for bombing raids or as a bridgehead.
51
 An attack via West Africa to Brazil and 
then New Orleans to Miami was the common scenario. But as skeptics reasonably 
suggested, ‘even if a German Expeditionary Force were somehow able to occupy West 
Africa and pass over the Atlantic to Brazil, it would still be as far from the United States 
as it had been in Europe. And how was a modern, mechanised army to traverse the 
jungles and mountains of South and Central America to invade the United States?’52 The 
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fear of a long-range threat presumed the emergence of an unchallenged Eurasian enemy, 
with other counterbalancing states eliminated. The actual events of the war throw doubt 
on that eventuality. Nazi Germany had already met stalemate on two fronts and its 
limitations were becoming visible. As well as its repulsion by Britain in 1940, Hitler’s 
armies had already passed their culminating point, had been struck by the Russian winter 
and failed to take Moscow, and the balance on the Eastern Front was gradually tilting to 
the defenders. With America as nonbelligerent offshore balancer providing material 
support to Britain and Russia, this was already proving sufficient to maintain ‘centers of 
resistance’ to deny Hitler the kind of Eurasian dominance that Lippmann feared.53  
 
Lippmann’s diplomatic expertise ran ahead of his military-technical expertise. He did not 
engage fully with the complexities about the geopolitical implications of modern military 
power. But Pearl Harbor leant a visceral popular appeal to his argument that America was 
directly threatened in a shrinking world. Lippmann successfully spearheaded it 
intellectually. He wrote not as a military technocrat, but as a prophet. Stressing the 
offensive long-range combat power of modern weapons was an effective way rhetorically 
to challenge notions that America could be secure without projecting power beyond its 
water’s edge. 
 
In stressing America’s self-destructive tendencies, he revived a long-standing idea in 
American prophecy. Aside from external aggressors, the roots of vulnerability lay not in 
military defeat, but through ‘free people’ forgetting how to govern themselves 
responsibly.
54
 America’s volatile politics caused it to be ‘too pacifist in times of peace 
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and too bellicose in times of war.’ If during peacetime it regarded war as an abomination, 
in war it embraced an eschatological view of the conflict as enacting a grand design to 
reorder the world.
55
 Both phases lead to disappointment and a relapse into each other. It 
was important to avoid both extremes and get strategy right not only to subdue external 
enemies or secure the country against predators abroad, but because incoherence could 
cause internal chaos, just as domestic strife could derange policy. Even victory could 
contain the seeds of future crisis:   
 
Our failure now to form a national policy will, though we defeat our enemies, leave us 
dangerously exposed to deadly conflict at home and to unmanageable perils abroad. For the 
return from a state of total war to a state of peace which no one trusts will raise catastrophic 
issues in our midst. Rent by domestic controversy, for want of a settled foreign policy we 
shall act not upon reflection and choice but under the impulse of accidents and the impact 
of force.
56
 
 
In a chain of causation, strategic failure and domestic divisions would reinforce each 
other. Lippmann echoed the likes of Alexander Hamilton, who argued that opposition to 
factionalism and sectional interest was the foundation for national security from external 
threats, and George Washington’s Farewell Speech of 1796, co-written by Hamilton, 
which admonished Americans in the wake of the bitter internal struggle over the Anglo-
American Jay Treaty to curtail party disputes in order to protect foreign policy.
57
 
Centrifugal forces within American politics trapped it in a ‘deadly cycle’, lurching from 
naïve isolation to crusading overreach. This was the tragedy of American diplomacy. 
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To show where Lippmann ‘sits’ intellectually, his work can be compared to two other 
strategic minds of the era, Edward Mead Earle and Nicholas Spykman. All three tried to 
combat the notion that America was special and therefore beyond power politics. They 
wanted to ‘de-exceptionalise’ America to destroy the stigma attached to traditional 
statecraft. But they differed on whether strategy was historically alien to American 
traditions and how to restore it. Earle sought to educate Americans through classical 
European models. Makers of Modern Strategy studied only two American officers 
Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan and General William Mitchell. Only three pages were 
devoted to George Washington and five to Thomas Jefferson. American national 
character was ‘mechanically minded and possessed of almost religious faith in the 
machine’, hence the lack of a Clausewitz or a Vauban.58 As well as the subject matter, the 
weighting towards Europe was reflected in the role of intellectual émigrés in the writing 
of Makers. Nine of twenty contributors were immigrants or first generation descendants 
of immigrants. Although Earle credited Alexander Hamilton with being one of the great 
orchestrating American minds
59
, Makers mostly treated American contributions as 
marginal. Earle was logocentric: he looked for codified ‘strategic doctrine’ as the 
expression of strategy. He found little theory in America’s heritage.  By contrast, 
Spykman did not invoke the Fathers, European models or any authority to legitimise its 
argument. To Spykman, supporting isolation or intervention by summoning sacred 
history was a distraction. America’s choices must be measured by their merits and utility, 
not by tradition. ‘Historical precedent and the voice of the Fathers can be used as a means 
to gain support for a doctrine but not as proof of its soundness. Not conformity with the 
past but workability in the present is the criterion of a sound policy.’60 
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Lippmann also rejected American exceptionalism. But instead of dismissing the 
Founders, he recast them as models of hard-headed strategy. As a journalist speaking to a 
wide readership, Lippmann was sensitive to the need to domesticate Realpolitik by 
presenting strategy as an authentic American tradition. The American audience was not a 
neutral machine that would rationally process argument, but could be swayed by appeals 
to collective memory. He focused on American historical models, especially the Monroe 
Doctrine of regional separation. Lippmann approached strategy as a set of practices and 
instincts, a logic to interactions that did not have to be theoretically articulated.
61
 
American foreign relations were born in a cradle of power-political sensibilities. 
Washington and Jefferson inherited a European diplomatic tradition, accepted the danger 
of conflict as a fact of life, supported appropriate temporary alliances, and advocated 
naval preparedness and restraint to buy time. They exploited America’s geographical 
advantages and European rivalries, enabling America to grow while avoiding over-
entanglement in European conflicts.
62
 Lippmann’s diagnosis was a Jeremiad. It showed 
America beginning with prudent diplomacy, lapsing into utopian naivety, and needing to 
be restored. By rejecting power politics, the prewar generation had squandered the capital 
of its forbears.
63
  
 
What was the solution? Neither strategic shock nor mechanistic reforms could do the job. 
It would take great men who could rise above democratic squabbles to constrain the 
people’s volatility. Lippmann urged restraint in domestic political competition, imploring 
elites to guide the democracy. In line with other anti-majoritarians who believed that 
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unfettered mass influence threatened sound policy, Lippmann argued that because the 
democratic mass was incompetent to judge foreign affairs, it was best to leave it to 
seasoned elites.
64
 The political class must close ranks and protect foreign policy and 
public opinion from one another. This explains his own wartime interventions, promoting 
during the 1940 election the bipartisan agreement to keep foreign policy debate off the 
table. It explains his support for overall consensus-seeking across the Executive and the 
Congress, such as the John Foster Dulles-Cordell Hull ‘truce’ of 1944, and his warning 
that internal political conflict could alienate the armed forces.
65
 
 
Lippmann’s ideal-type was George Washington. Lippmann made Washington embody 
his patrician longing for a virtuous leader who tames the wayward people. Lippmann’s 
Washington supported popular sovereignty but doubted the sanctity of popular will, and 
led his countryman ‘until they could decide the issue between defeat and victory, between 
their own disunion, which would have destroyed them, and the union that has proved to 
be their salvation.’66 Two contemporary ‘Washingtons’ emerged, President Roosevelt 
and the Republican nominee of 1940, Wendell Willkie. After Willkie’s death in October 
1944, Lippmann praised him for rising above factionalism to protect American 
diplomacy.
67
 He regarded Willkie’s nomination in 1940 as second in importance only to 
the Battle of Britain, because it neutralized foreign policy out of the election debate. 
Otherwise, the Republican Party would have gone isolationist and made it almost 
impossible to assist allies and buy time to prepare for war, leaving America ‘isolated, 
divided and desperately hard pressed.’68  
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After Roosevelt’s death on 12 April 1945, Lippmann praised the him as ‘a remarkable 
strategist’ who denied Nazi Germany and Japan the chance to form a junction to fight a 
combined war, while the Allies ‘gathered and advanced their own forces.’69 Roosevelt’s 
approach at Tehran and Yalta, placing power politics at the core of the new international 
architecture coincided with Lippmann’s blueprint of a post-war consortium of Great 
Powers, paying heed to Stalin’s security objectives and realistically accommodating the 
Soviet Union’s sphere of influence that the advancing Red Army had turned into fact.  
 
Lippmann was an anti-triumphalist.  He disliked notions of America’s world-historical 
role as redeemer nation and was uneasy with wartime internationalism and the ideal that 
America could reorder the world away from power politics towards permanent peace.
70
 
Victory was merely a fleeting political opportunity. The timing of his writings is 
significant. His warnings about the post-war collapse of the alliance and future 
insolvency were conceived at the moment of success. As he warned of post-war tragedy 
in world politics in US War Aims of July 1944, the Allies had won major victories at 
Midway, El Alamein, Guadalcanal, Tripoli and Tunisia, the German Sixth Army had 
been destroyed at Stalingrad, and the Allies had prevailed in the Battle of the Atlantic.  
 
Lippmann’s fears were realized after the war, as he lost faith in his effort to instill 
responsible restraint into US diplomacy. Already in March 1945 he found that the 
idealistic masses made it difficult to wean elites from ‘the Wilsonian ideology into 
something that fits the realities.’71 Two historical points mark Lippmann’s shift into 
pessimism about America’s capacity to break the deadly cycle and his loss of faith in 
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elites themselves: the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, and the Korean War from 1950. 
The transition from Roosevelt to Truman was critical to Lippmann’s pessimism. Before 
the Truman Administration’s Cold War stance solidified, he worried that there was no 
overarching strategy in a fragmented government.
72
 With the growing antagonism against 
Stalin, the administration abandoned its accommodating stance and turned ‘its obligations 
to Greece and Turkey into what appeared to be a world-wide commitment to resist Soviet 
expansionism wherever it appeared.’73 Lippmann had articulated during the war 
territorialized goals, which urged a negotiated distance from the Soviet Union. Yet 
Truman eventually announced universal, expansive goals. Eleven months after the 
Truman Doctrine was proclaimed, Lippmann argued: 
 
We have won both wars. But on the crucial issues our diplomacy has thus far always 
miscarried. It has been unable to prevent war. It has been unable to avoid war. It has not 
prepared us for war. It has not been able to settle the wars when they have been fought and 
won…Now after two victorious world wars, we find ourselves discussing the possibility of a 
third world war.
74
  
 
Truman’s ambitious program to check Soviet expansion, with an arms buildup and a web 
of alliances around the Soviet perimeter, seemed to embody the insolvency Lippmann 
had foreseen. The swollen costs exceeded America’s power and instead of a calibrated 
rivalry, it became a crusade.  
 
The intertwining of foreign policy and domestic political strife in the early Cold War 
persuaded Lippmann that the United States could not be guided towards enlightened 
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diplomacy. Having committed America to a worldwide resistance to Communist 
expansion on national security grounds, non-intervention in China, the successful 
Chinese communist revolution, and the first detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb 
created domestic pressure and accusations of weakness abroad and betrayal within, 
coarsening domestic politics. Truman was a victim of his own heightened rhetoric, as 
‘The administration found itself entrapped in the strategic images that it had earlier 
propagated amongst the public to gain support for its policies.’75 Here was the ‘Lippmann 
gap’ and pernicious effects of domestic political turmoil practically demonstrated.  
 
Lippmann was disappointed with Washington’s failure in defining its sphere of 
commitment to stick to a geographical outer limit. Secretary of State Dean Acheson at the 
National Press Club in January 1950 defined an American defence line short of Formosa 
or Korea, a speech Lippmann admired.
76
 Yet Truman then committed troops to the 
Korean peninsula. Acheson admitted that one motive was to outflank domestic critics 
such as the China Lobby and hard-line Cold Warriors and neutralize the charge of being 
‘soft’ on communism, to prove a beleaguered President’s anti-communist credentials. 
Defining and sustaining clear and limited war aims was difficult given the competing 
demands of alliance bargaining, the pulse of the battlefield, the drive to escalate from 
General Douglas MacArthur and the President’s rhetoric that made compromise harder to 
accept.
77
 This resulted in the expansion of the war beyond the 38
th
 parallel and conflict 
with China, ‘one of the greatest mistakes in our history’, and a crisis in civil-military 
relations.
78
 Incoherence abroad made possible the ascent of Senator McCarthy’s 
demagoguery.
79
 This reflected both a systemic failure - the National Security Council’s 
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inability to harmonise diplomacy with military force - and a lack of ‘good men’, or strong 
elite guardians.
80
  
 
By 1948 he judged that Truman lacked the statesmanship to oversee German 
reconstruction
81; by 1950 he decided that America’s dealings with China failed because 
amateur Congressmen, journalists and officers had overruled professionals.
82
 This view 
of wise Cassandras being defeated by crude populism he would later theorise as ‘The 
Malady of Democratic States’: the climate of modern democracy meant that men worth 
listening to were discouraged from speaking out.
83
 Lippmann elevated his criticisms of 
mass politics into a theory about the direct link between the franchise and inconclusive 
wars.
84
 
 
Lippmann’s disillusionment also grew from the fact that his own arguments were 
received only selectively. In terms of impact, his writing helped to popularize the idea 
that American security rested on the balance of forces abroad. But his warnings against 
an imprudent counter-reaction into overstretch had less impact. Since Pearl Harbor, the 
reaction in the balance of opinion against the failures of isolationism and towards 
intervention was so overwhelming that it was difficult to popularize the case for a more 
restrained balancing act. Overcoming ‘isolationism,’ rather than balancing ends and 
means, dominated congressional and public debate.
85
 Policymakers looked past 
Lippmann’s sense of tragedy, ignored his warnings about the limits of power and the 
propensity for American victory to become a mere armistice. 
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This cherry picking of Lippmann’s ideas was evident when the Ladies Home Journal 
presented his ideas in comic-book form.
86
 It depicted Lippmann’s concept of the 
transoceanic breadth of America’s security interests, the need to preserve the wartime 
alliance and reform the aggressor nations, and it conveyed the failures of prewar 
disarmament and rejection of alliances. But it overlooked his arguments about the mutual 
spiral of foreign policy drift and domestic disorder. The direct threat of a world order 
dominated by the Axis aggressors overshadowed the other dimension of Lippmann’s 
prophecy about the more insidious threat America posed to its own security.  
  
Once US Foreign Policy was published, men of state took it as a manifesto for a forward-
leaning military presence, particularly in the post-war era. James Forrestal endorsed it, 
the Under Secretary of the Navy and later Secretary of Defence, but interpreted the book 
not as an argument for balance, but as an argument for a ‘positive’ as opposed to a 
‘passive’ policy.87  In December 1945, Lippmann wrote that America’s task was not to 
secure worldwide democracy, but to make communism and democracy co-exist. 
Competitive coexistence was possible, and he analogised the Soviet Union with the 
medieval Islamic empire as a rival force with an ideology of conquest that could be lived 
with.
88
 Forrestal disagreed and launched his own study.
89
 The gulf between them was 
accentuated when Forrestal suggested to Lippmann privately after the 1948 Prague crisis 
that America might have to make preventative war against the Soviet Union.
90
 John 
McCloy, then the assistant secretary of war and soon-to-be high commissioner of 
occupied Germany, found his views ‘enlightening.’91 But McCloy like Forrestal went on 
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to advocate not Lippmann’s concert-balance strategy and bilateral withdrawal from 
occupied Germany, but global hegemony.  
 
America’s antagonism with the Soviet Union drove Lippmann apart from Washington’s 
doctrines and policies. Lippmann’s debate with diplomat and strategist George Kennan 
about a containment doctrine was based on misunderstandings that flowed from 
ambiguities in Kennan’s writings.92 In actuality, both believed in a form of containment 
that was selective and asymmetrical, rather than indiscriminate and universal, in a long-
haul competitive coexistence with the Soviet Union. Like Kennan, Lippmann feared that 
a commitment to a long-term military presence in a divided Europe would be an obstacle 
to a settlement with Moscow, and the drive for an independent West Germany had 
triggered Moscow’s aggressive response in the Berlin blockade (June 1948-may 1949). 
He also opposed the expansion of America’s formal alliances and the creation in April 
1949 of a greater NATO beyond the Atlantic area. Lippmann unsuccessfully proposed an 
alternative, a diplomatic settlement with a bilateral withdrawal from a unified, 
demilitarised and neutralised Germany. This followed the logic of his wartime prophecies 
that negotiated buffer space in Central Europe and the limitation of military presence was 
a surer way to security than proximity and mutual spirals of distrust. But he was rebuffed 
in the creation of West Germany, the formation of NATO and the Korean War. 
 
How can we explain Lippmann’s failure to influence post-war strategy? Part of the 
answer can be found in America’s increased power and in the raw opportunity for post-
war expansion. The change in power relativities as a result of World War Two left 
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America’s might artificially high in 1945.93 It experienced unprecedented industrial 
expansion. It reached the highest per capita productivity, the highest standard of living, 
domination of the world’s gold reserves, and became the largest creditor and exporter. Its 
capacity to project power globally with long range bombers and carrier task forces was 
unparalleled. It had a nuclear monopoly. There was great worldwide demand for its loans 
and weapons. If massive relative power creates a temptation for ‘visionary world 
making,’94 it was a utopian moment fertile for such ideas. American leaders ‘eagerly 
reached for their mandate of heaven.’95 This made Washington inhospitable to 
Lippmann’s arguments for restraint, diplomatic compromise and the creation of spheres 
of influence.  
 
Lippmann’s post-war marginality in world of policy also reflected the government’s 
instrumental approach to intellectual advice.
96
 When he argued for restraint against the 
grain of its preconceptions, he did not get his way. The state was not an open recipient of 
ideas willing to be dissuaded by civil society, but an autonomous actor harnessing ideas 
to serve preconceived ends. Cold War intellectuals functioned more often as legitimizers 
and rationalisers after the fact. Intellectual concepts mattered, but only had a modest 
creative role.
97
 By and large, governments selected ideas that suited and legitimized their 
agenda. Expertise could take effect, but mostly in terms of legitimizing and popularizing 
rather than changing policy.  
 
Lippmann’s prophecy also had its limits and weaknesses. It was a form of political 
rhetoric about national decline. His elitist philosophy his own faith in expertise was at 
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times misplaced. His disappointment was rooted not in the caliber of leaders but in an 
idealized vision of the early republic. Lippmann like Niebuhr argued in the classical 
tradition of Plato and Aristotle that justice was more effectively pursued by smaller 
polities. World powers, like the United States, would have difficulty in replicating the 
virtues of intimate communities.
98
 With ‘distance and ignorance’, complex choices were 
subjected to simplism and ideology.
99
 Lippmann’s ideal was the smaller, eighteenth 
century republic of tutored citizens. Industrialization and an ill-informed mass public 
heralded the decline of democratic values. But after World War Two, the very things he 
disliked about mass society – its inconstancy and strategic illiteracy -he found replicated 
in the political class who were supposed to rise above it. During the Korean war, 
Lippmann effectively upended his own faith in expertise by turning on one of the most 
established veterans of government, Dean Acheson. 
 
Ultimately, few if any leaders could live up to his ideals. Lippmann held contemporary 
rulers to a high standard based on a hagiographic view of the Founding Fathers. While he 
rightly identified the prudent strategic principles laid out in Washington’s Farewell 
Address, the Fathers as they were might also have failed Lippmann’s exacting test, given 
that they could be heavily factional and also launched reckless wars, such as President 
James Madison’s invasion of Canada. As an elitist who continuously lost faith in elites, 
Lippmann eventually turned against Presidents Hoover, Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, 
and even Roosevelt in 1944. It is not much of an exaggeration that leaders had to die 
before Lippmann idealized them.  
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With its story of heroes and decline, prophecy lends itself to historical oversimplification. 
Lippmann was right that British seapower underwrote America’s hemispheric security in 
the nineteenth century. Yet Britain in American eyes was a threat as well as a partner in 
enforcing the Monroe Doctrine. ‘Free security’ was a label interwar Americans gave to a 
period that was actually an age of anxiety. Britain’s Royal Navy was constantly feared. 
Well before German naval power rose to challenge Britain, a tradition of military thinkers 
(‘guardians’) was dedicated to fortifying coastal harbors and preparing defences to 
protect cities on the Atlantic seaboard from British assault. American naval expansionists 
in the 1880’s appealed to the image not of a country sheltered by the British navy, but 
‘ringed by hostile states bent on laying waste its coastal cities.’100 Lippmann underplayed 
this dark side of Anglo-American relations because he promoted an image of a culturally 
connected, historically natural and strategically linked Atlantic community. 
Paradoxically, he had a calculating approach to power but a strongly ideological concept 
of America’s role as guardian of Atlantic civilization. By leaving out the history of 
Anglo-American antagonism and placing maritime collaboration in the foreground, 
Lippmann fashioned an ‘imagined community’ of Atlantic nations that was both 
strategically and ideologically coherent.
101
  
 
The major theme in Lippmann’s writing was the pernicious effects of democracy on 
strategy.
102
 His blaming of democracy rested on dubious foundations. It sprang partly 
from a romantic concept of the orderly pre-industrial, pre-democratic world and its 
limitation of war, a notion that is historically overstated.
103
 Authoritarian regimes also 
have undertaken ruinous military adventures, from the crowned rulers in the Thirty Years 
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War to Imperial Japan’s brutal expansionism in Lippmann’s own time, which cannot be 
attributed to an excess of popular sovereignty. Lippmann ascribed to democracy 
problems that are inherent in strategy. Once America went beyond national self-defence 
into the open-ended pursuit of national security, its defence perimeter became unclear 
and potentially boundless, an endlessly shifting frontier. War itself continued to disrupt 
boundaries that Lippmann believed ought to be settled, and changed the power-political 
realities. For his argument in favour of natural spheres of influence, Lippmann himself 
could not stick to continuous boundaries. In US Foreign Policy he initially proposed a 
neutral buffer zone in Eastern Europe, then the following year, he accepted it as a Soviet 
sphere. The Red Army’s advances changed the equation. He initially favoured the 
unification of Korea in vague terms,
104
 then opposed a land war to enforce it. Japan he 
had once regarded as an advance base of US power, writing in March 1948 in the wake of 
the Soviet Prague coup that it should be built up as part of a holding strategy, as the 
Japanese islands were the ‘main base for action in eastern Asia’ and that America should 
build up the power to ‘dominate Soviet Siberia.’105 By December 1950 he rejected the 
notion that America could occupy Japan, because its forces would be vulnerable to a 
Soviet atomic strike, because a Pacific battle would be too vast, and because Korea 
demonstrated the costs of land commitments. Now America should switch to a maritime 
and carrier-centric strategy of sea denial from a more contracted Pacific perimeter from 
Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, to the Philippines
.
.
106
 The changing military context often refused 
to be subordinated to policy, altering political aims. 
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None of these changing opinions were necessarily unreasonable, but they demonstrate 
that even a seasoned intellectual who resisted demagogic politics struggled to define 
American interests. New technology, power configurations, and economic constraints 
unsettled well-ordered strategic blueprints. This difficulty did not flow from the 
democratic character of America, but from the inherent difficulties in strategy itself. 
Inconstancy was one of the weaknesses of democracy that Lippmann most disliked, yet 
he continually changed his mind if not on the abstract principles, the concrete details of 
American diplomacy. Even the strategic vision of experts could only be provisional, 
because it constantly had to adjust to the unexpected and the unknown.  
 
Why, then, does Lippmann still matter? His views of American diplomacy were hardly 
infallible. He argued from an elitist, anti-democratic position that could be ahistorical. He 
strugged to answer the questions he posed about American statecraft. In terms of direct 
influence on policy, he became a marginal figure. But he still offers a good point of 
departure for considering America’s strategic dilemmas today. ‘Strategy’ can be an 
empty word and a narrow, unreflective process, a reductionist debate between the poles 
of ‘isolationism’ and ‘leadership’, the mere maximization of means in pursuit of fixed, 
unquestioned ‘ends’, with a fixation on solutions rather than defining problems, on 
external threats rather than self-defeating behaviour. Lippmann offers a richer conception 
of strategy that goes beyond binary slogans, that is sensitive to the relation between costs 
and commitments and the limits of power. Above all, he turns attention to the dangers 
that powerful states can pose to themselves. In this regard Lippmann stands in an 
American prophetic tradition, echoing Abraham Lincoln’s warning that the destruction of 
29 
America would not come from the hands of a ‘transatlantic military giant’ but from 
within, and anticipating Reinhold Niebuhr’s fear that if America ever perished, ‘the 
strength of a giant nation was directed by eyes too blind to see all the hazards of the 
struggle.’107 
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